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We now face the possibility of a radical alteration—I hesitate to use 
so emotive a term as “reform”—in our country’s tax system. We face the 
possible introduction of an entirely new tax, and one which may, I think, 
be regarded as foreign to the British fiscal system, of which our own is an 
offshoot.
This new tax, the tax on value added, will, if introduced, undoubtedly 
become a central element in the Government’s armoury of devices for raising 
—or, if you prefer it, extorting—revenue from the Rhodesian public. It will 
replace, in part or in full, a number of other sources of revenue and redistri­
bute the burden of taxation not only in legal form but also in its incidence 
upon individuals.
In stressing the significance of this new tax, I  must, however, warn 
against regarding it, or its potential effects as revolutionary. Put briefly, it 
will, if introduced on the basis proposed by the recent Committee on the 
subject, increase indirect taxation by a net amount of £8,500,000 per annum. 
This will be accompanied by a decrease of some £7,600,000 in direct taxation, 
the balance of £900,000 being unapportioned. On the current year’s estimates, 
this would represent a swing of something over 10% of revenue receipts from 
direct to indirect taxation, the value added tax in isolation then representing 
some 20% of total revenue receipts.
These figures give some indication of the importance of the change 
proposed, but also show that the new tax will not be the main foundation 
of the fiscal system. To me, they suggest, also, that the favourable or un­
favourable effects of the tax on the economy are more likely to be, in general, 
marginal rather than fundamental in nature. I certainly do not see this new 
impost either as an economic panacea or, for that matter, as a serious threat 
to our future prosperity.
I enter this caveat mainly because some of the arguments already 
advanced for or against the tax have been couched in what I regard as rather 
extreme terms. Equally, and for the purposes of clarity, some of the points 
I shall later make will possibly be, in isolation, overstated.
1 Paper read to the Society in September 1967.
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This will, I  hope, not prove a serious defect for it is, in any event, not my 
purpose to attempt a comprehensive analysis of the possible effects, let alone 
the operation of the new tax. I  hope, instead, for no more than to raise a 
limited number of points on the general economic results of the introduction 
of the tax—points which may suggest lines for further discussion and investi­
gation.
As a final caveat, I  do not propose to go into any detail in describing 
the tax itself. I  think it sufficient to distinguish between turnover taxes, levied 
on the entire sales of taxable bodies, and the value added tax, levied only on 
income less purchases. The former class of tax, if levied at more than one 
level in the economy results in double, or repeated taxation of products— 
the tax-on-tax or cascade effect; the latter avoids it.
The only other point I  think worth noting in defining the tax is that it 
may be levied on sales less non-capital purchases plus an allowance for the 
depreciation of capital equipment. It may also be levied—and this is what 
is proposed for Rhodesia—on sales, including sales of capital equipment, 
less purchases, including capital purchases. In this latter form—the consump­
tion variant and allowing for the taxation of imports and the exemption of 
exports—its base is, in effect, private consumption expenditure, plus public 
current expenditure on goods and services.
Having thus most cursorily defined the new tax, I  find it interesting to 
reflect that, two years ago or less, few in Rhodesia had any clear idea of its 
nature. In fact, I sometimes wonder how many of us even today have any 
clear concept of it. Let me hasten to explain that, in referring to “us”, I  do 
not mean my present audience, no doubt fully acquainted with all aspects 
of the tax—I mean the Rhodesian public and, specifically, the business 
community.
I  make this remark because it has, over recent weeks, been borne force­
fully upon me that a disturbingly high proportion of businessmen seem to 
have little idea of the form, let alone of the possible effects of the tax and, 
not unusually, that the strength of their opinions on the merits of the tax 
is inversely proportionate to their understanding of it.
This leads me to wonder whether we, in this country, are likely to repeat 
the Irish experience of 1963. That country then considered and introduced 
a turnover tax, whose birth pangs have been described in the following 
terms:—
“This unconventional publicity for a new tax prior to its introduction was an 
attempt to condition people to a major change in taxation and to allow time 
for its justification to be realised. Theoretically, this seemed to be the right
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way of approaching the problem but, practically, the time-lag from its first 
official mention to its introduction and implementation allowed the forces 
of opposition to grow. The introduction of the tax came close to over­
throwing the Government. . .  ”2
A Revolutionary Tax
The new tax, therefore, represents a measure foreign to established fiscal
policy in Rhodesia and in the countries with which it shares common traditions; 
a measure of which most Rhodesians until recently knew little or nothing; 
a measure of whose nature and effects there is still much ignorance and more 
uncertainty; but a measure which, if adopted, would greatly change the 
Rhodesian fiscal horizon. Where, then, has the proposal for its adoption 
originated?
The simplest answer is in the Report of the Committee on Value Added 
Turnover Taxation published here a short time ago.3 That Committee was, 
in turn, set up by the Minister of Finance a year ago to consider the pros 
and cons of the tax. But the true origin of the tax, and hence of its possible 
adoption in Rhodesia, must be sought in France.
That country was the first and is still the only major state to apply a 
value added tax. Denmark, I believe, has it; the state of Michigan uses it; 
and, it was recommended by Americans for use in Japan, but their advice 
was not acted upon.
On the other hand, Germany will follow France’s example on the 1st 
January 1968 and the whole of the European Economic Community will, 
by the beginning of 1970, have adopted a value added tax applied under 
uniform principles, though not necessarily at uniform rates.
The French Experience
I  lay some emphasis on the French origin of the tax mainly because this 
has, in some minds, undoubtedly given it an emotional aura not conducive 
to its logical and critical examination. Admirers of planning in a form less 
extreme than that practised in Communist countries find in France both the 
model and the proof of the desirability, even necessity, of this form of central 
direction and exhortation. For those already convinced in this respect, it is
2 M. J. MacCormac, "Turnover Taxes—The Irish Experience”: Lloyds Bank Review,
April, 1967.
3 Report of the Committee on Value Added Turnover Taxation C.S.R. 34-1967.
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easy to see in France’s value added tax another—and related—device whose 
merits are self-evident and whose adoption consequently and equally obviously 
desirable.
Sure enough, the report of our own Rhodesian Committee states:— 
“The subsequent success of the French tax on “value added” in relation to 
re-equipment and exports may be attributed largely to the removal 
of its predecessors’ disincentive effects in these fields.” (para. 11).
This curiously worded passage assumes that the value added tax has had 
a success, whose nature and extent is unspecified, in its effects on capital 
formation and exports and that this success would have been denied France 
had that tax not replaced the earlier production and transaction taxes.
Apart from the fact that this view seems markedly to overstate the 
extent and speed of the French reforms and apart from the difficulty, common 
to all practical economics, of isolating the overall effects of a single measure 
there is, I  suggest, no evidence that any successes secured by France in the 
fields of investment or exports have not been equalled or surpassed by other 
countries with other tax systems—including systems which, in their “cascade”, 
o r cumulative effects, were similar to that whose replacement in France 
allegedly had such favourable effects.
In much the same way as I am doubtful of a simple and unsubstantiated 
contention that the tax has proved good for France—and hence will be good 
for us—I see little merit in the argument that, because the tax is spreading 
through the EEC, it must be desirable and, hence, should be adopted here. 
I think it worth stressing that European countries have, generally, long relied 
on turnover and similar taxes for a substantial part of their revenue; that the 
value added tax is clearly preferable to a cascade type of turnover tax; that 
the replacement of the latter by the former—as the Community intends—is, 
in consequence, desirable; but that it does not follow that the introduction 
of the value added tax, other than as a substitute for a simple multi-stage 
turnover tax, has anything much to commend it. And we are not, in Rhodesia, 
faced with such a substitution.
This is, in fact, recognised by the Committee when it says:—
“It is pertinent to recall here that the success of VAT in France, in relation 
to modernisation and exports, stemmed in great measure from the dis­
incentive effects of the taxes it replaced, and it is clear that to achieve 
success, where no particular disabilities already exist, the introduction 
of VAT would have to be accompanied by other fiscal reforms”, (para. 35).
In brief, the tax succeeded in France mainly because it was better than 
the taxes it replaced. Yet our own present taxes impose no particular disabili­
ties of the sort inherent in those former French taxes. If this is so, it is fair
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to approach the case for introducing the French tax here with a  measure of 
scepticism. May its transplantation to Rhodesia not prove as great a fiasco 
as the transplantation of that Gallic panacea, indicative planning, to Britain?
The Rhodesian Proposals
So much for the background. I must now turn to a rather more 
detailed examination of what may be in store for Rhodesians. It is in brief 
proposed, as a basis of discussion, that the difference between the cost of 
the purchases of goods, including capital goods, and services having in both 
cases already borne tax and the value of sales, including sales of capital goods, 
should be treated as value added and be subjected to tax at a flat or constant 
rate. It is further suggested—still more tentatively—that this rate may be 
1\% \ that the tax should be introduced over 4 years, and that it should be 
accompanied by the abolition of the sales tax, personal tax, supertax and 
undistributed profits tax, the reduction of income tax and various other lesser 
measures.
The proposals envisage that the value added tax should apply to all 
sellers of goods with a turnover of £5,000 per annum or more and to all 
providers of services whose annual turnover exceeds £1,000. This of course, 
creates a broad range of exemption from the tax—it would, obviously, exempt 
from its application most African farmers, and, I imagine, a large proportion 
of African traders.
Despite this exemption, however, it is clear that the system, as at present 
proposed, looks to a simpler, more general and more uniform tax structure 
than that of, say, France. In that country, for example, a turnover tax 
continues to exist as, for some enterprises, an alternative and, for others, a 
substitute for the value added tax; the rates at which the tax applies vary 
from 6.4% to 33.3%, with some goods enjoying total exemption.
This sort of discrimination in rates, even if socially justifiable, gives rise 
to quite obvious anomalies. One can, I suppose, appreciate the emotions 
which allow war memorials to share with basic perishable foodstuffs the 
privilege of total exemption. But why should honey be exempt and jam pay 
6.4%? Why should at least some newspapers and periodicals be exempt, yet 
books pay 11.1%? Why are cine cameras, at 29.9%, clearly less of a luxury 
than radio sets at 33.3%?
The Problem of Exemptions
To give an example of the sort of complication to which this form of 
discrimination gives rise, I can, I think, do no better than to quote from
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Clara K. Sullivan’s book4, “The Tax on Value Added” , known to at least 
some of you as being, in its own blurb, “The first definitive treatment of the 
value added tax to appear in any languge”—its style often leaves some doubt 
of the language in which it is written.
I quote:—
“Newspapers and periodicals are exempt on their sales . . . provided that 
they conform with certain requirements, notably that of having a character 
of general interest in the diffusion of information, instruction, education 
and recreation. A similar exemption applies to publications of philanthropic 
organisations or those whose purpose is devoid of special interest and to 
periodicals published by organisations for family gardens”. (Page 90).
Leaving on one side the fascinating possibilities of this sort of thing as 
a hunting ground for tax collectors, tax avoiders and their supporting 
accountants and lawyers, it is worth noting that one merit claimed for the 
value added tax is its neutrality, its avoidance of such artificial incentives as 
that to vertical integration inherent in the cascade tax. This merit is largely 
lost in France and as Sullivan puts it:—
“Such differential taxation not only distorts the competitive relationships 
among various industries and firms within an industry but also leads to 
changes in business methods not intended by the tax and, moreover, directs 
taxpayers efforts towards the nonproductive pursuit of tax avoidance”. 
(Page 120).
As I  have indicated, our version of the tax is at present intended to be 
uniform and reasonably general in its application. I personally doubt, however, 
whether our own, if actually introduced, will more closely approach the 
virgin purity of the present proposals than the less virtuous form o f its 
French model.
It seems to me reasonably clear that many segments of the business 
community, and particularly those organised bodies which at their annual 
congresses raucously assert their claim to be the back-bone of the country 
—Rhodesia must, to coin a word, be one of the most multi-vertebrate of 
nations—will claim that they deserve special treatment as an interim 
measure. And I see little in our history to suggest that some special interests 
will not secure concessions—and that interim concessions will not become 
as permanent as anything else in the fiscal system.
I have thus far referred briefly to what I see as the background of this 
proposed tax and have suggested that it is unlikely to be as simple or, in 
economic terms, neutral as has been suggested. The most important question
4 Clara K. Sullivan “The Tax on Value Added".
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is, however, why the introduction of the tax should, in Rhodesian conditions, 
be considered desirable.
The Case for the Tax in Rhodesia
The three points I have most often seen stressed in this respect are the 
roles of the value added tax as a promoter of efficiency, as an incentive to 
exports and as a tool of economic planning. Our own Rhodesian committee 
of enquiry has, in fact, laid much stress on at least the first two of these points.
On the question of efficiency, it said, for example:—
“ . . . where there is a tax on profits the usual consequence of increased 
profits is the payment of increased tax. Accordingly, taxation on profits 
does not encourage increased efforts towards efficiency. Where there is a 
tax on costs, on the other hand, the incidence of taxation is complementary 
to the businessman’s natural aspirations; he has an added incentive to 
reduce costs and thereby both minimise his tax and maximise his profits” . 
(Para. 37).
As a general statement this may be true. It is, however, open to question 
in many practical respects.
Businessmen normally conduct their affairs in pursuit of profits; govern­
ments generally tax those profits, our own government at a basic rate of 7/3d. 
in the pound. A Rhodesian entrepreneur seeking to earn any profits at all 
will, therefore, do so in the knowledge that, broadly speaking, he will receive 
12/9d. of each pound and have to hand over the balance of 7/3d. to the fiscus.
Thus the usual consequence of increased profits is not only, as the 
committee says, the payment of increased tax; it is also the generation of 
increased profits after tax. It seems to me most likely that, except in rare 
individual cases, this balance remaining after tax is sufficient incentive to 
increase pre-tax profits, either by higher prices or by greater efficiency. While 
accepting, therefore, that a tax on profits may not encourage a search for 
higher profits through greater efficiency, I doubt whether, at the present 
Rhodesian tax rates, it discourages that search.
As a matter of fact, I also subscribe in some measure to the modern 
dogma, or heresy, that the maximisation of profits, whether before or after 
tax, is not necessarily the prime or even a main objective of the managers 
of the modem corporation. I accept, however, that a small country such as 
our own may have a higher proportion of entrepreneurs with a direct interest 
in the profits of their own businesses than is the case in more mature 
economies, so I confine myself to mentioning, without pressing this further 
objection to the committee’s reasoning.
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To revert to the main line of my argument, I  would, I  think, accept that 
a tax on value added, comprising costs and profits, would, in a competitive 
situation, give some incentive to a reduction in costs. I doubt, however, 
whether the situation in Rhodesia—or in most other countries—is as com­
petitive as all that; I suspect, instead, that the tax would probably be regarded 
by a large sector of the community as another element in costs. Its imposition 
would be treated in much the same way as any other marginal increase in 
those costs—absorbed in some reduction in profit margins or more probably 
be incorporated into prices.
To this extent I tend to agree with the view of the British Committee on 
Turnover Taxation,5 the Richardson Committee, when it said;—
“Economists would agree that a tax on goods would generally cause prices 
to rise. The imposition of a tax on a single article may not raise the price 
by the full amount of the tax . . . When, however, a generalised tax such 
as a turnover tax or value-added tax is imposed on all goods and services, 
the tax is likely to be passed on in full . . . ”. (Para. 211).
This view has been much criticised, but it seems to me to have a good 
deal of practical strength. It may overstate the position in suggesting the 
complete transfer of the tax to the final consumer, but I  see little reason to 
doubt that the bulk will be so transferred.
Our own Committee’s remarks add some strength to this view. It said, 
in part:—
“. . .  a part of the tax is likely to be passed on and prices would tend to rise”, 
but that:—
“Such pressure as did emerge would not be evenly distributed, nor would it 
be the only pressure; the general trend of prices is upward and the tax 
reform, at most, would add force to other factors”. (Para. 51).
To digress, this latter paragraph highlights one unfortunate aspect of 
the Rhodesian Committee’s report. Any favourable effects are directly 
attributed to the proposed tax; most, if not all, unfavourable effects are 
presented merely as strengthening existing trends. Even if this latter contention 
is true, a measure which increases the rise in prices from, say, 3% to 5% 
in a year has itself been solely responsible for a 2%  increase in prices and 
must be judged in the light of that effect rather than excused on the grounds 
that it has only added force to an underlying trend.
1
VAT and Company Taxation
Returning from that digression, it must be noted that the Committee 
in no sense envisages the value added tax as a substitute for the tax on
5 Report of the Committee on Turnover Taxation H.M.S.O. Cmnd. 2300. 1964.
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profits, a substitution which, if complete or near complete, might strengthen 
its argument on efficiency. It proposes, instead, that the introduction of the 
value added tax at a rate of 1\%  should be accompanied by a reduction 
of the income tax on companies from 7/3d. to 6/- in the pound.
Any additional profits will, therefore, continue to result in the payment 
of increased taxes. The rate of tax on them will be 7J%, or 1/6 in the pound, 
plus 6/- in the pound on the balance, or a total of 7/0.6d. This rate, slightly 
lower than the present, will be the marginal rate of tax where profits are 
increased by means of increased gross revenue—by a price increase or a larger 
sales volume. The marginal rate where the profits accrue from a reduction 
in costs within a static gross revenue will, however, be only 6/-, the 7J% 
applying equally to costs and profits and, hence, being unaffected by the 
change in their relative magnitudes.
In present circumstances, therefore, an entrepreneur achieving an addi­
tional £1 of profit by way of an increase in total revenue will generally receive 
12/9d. of it and pay 7/3d. in tax. Under the new system he will receive 12/11.4d. 
of it and pay 7/0.6d. in tax. Where he achieves it by way of a reduction in 
costs without a corresponding reduction in revenue, he now receives 12/9d. 
net of tax but, under the new system, would benefit to the extent of 14/-.
Finally, a businessman reducing his costs, excluding tax, by £1 will, 
at the same time, reduce his value added tax to be met from his gross profit 
margin by l/6d.—this if he passes on the cost reduction to his customers and 
reduces his gross revenue accordingly. We thus have three positions, namely:—
(a) if a businessman increases his gross revenue by £1, his costs 
remaining static, he now retains 12/9d. after tax but would, in future, 
retain 12/11.4d.—an insignificant change;
(b) if a businessman increases his gross profit within a static revenue 
by £1—reducing costs and increasing profits by this amount— he 
now retains 12/9d. after tax; under the proposed system a pound 
transferred from costs to profits this tax will yield him a net profit 
after tax of 14/- as opposed to 12/9d. at present;
(c) if a businessman reduces his costs and revenue by £1 his net profit 
after tax will, at present, be unaffected; if he does so in his pre-tax 
costs under the new system, the deduction from his gross profit 
for the new tax will be reduced by l/6d.—as against this, income 
tax at the new standard rate of 6/- would reduce the benefit net 
of that tax to 1/Od.
VAT and Efficiency
It is to the benefits under these two last heads that we must look for the 
incentive to greater efficiency. It will be noted that a reduction of £1 in costs
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passed oa to consumers yields an increase in profits after tax of 1/Od.; if not 
passed on, the benefit is 14/-. Thus, though the tax gives some possible incen­
tive to cost reductions, it is only competition which is likely to reduce prices.
It is, in this connection, possibly worth mentioning that Kaldor6, in a 
memorandum generally favourable to the introduction of a value added tax 
in Britain, saw it as a potential replacement of the purchase tax, the profits 
tax on companies and the income tax on their undistributed profits. Discussing 
the resultant effects on efficiency, he concluded that, if the new tax replaced 
only the purchase and profits taxes—and not the undistributed profits tax— 
or the purchase tax alone, the advantage would not justify the administrative 
burden.
I  feel, therefore, that the incentive to efficiency provided by a value added 
tax introduced as a partial substitute for direct taxes on profits should not be 
over-estimated.
The committee’s own comments in this respect, indeed, give an impression 
of clutching at straws. To quote:—
“ . . .  although the Rhodesian economy is not as sophisticated in this respect 
as that of more developed countries, the Committee does not believe that 
the introduction of VAT would give no encouragement at all to increased 
efficiency. . .  ” . (para. 38).
This is something less than a full-blooded and enthusiastic endorsement 
of this alleged benefit of the tax.
Equally important, I wonder whether any increase in efficiency promoted 
by the new tax, would, in the context of the tax’s general economic effects, be 
desirable. The Committee’s report states, quite flatly, that:—
c %
“ . . .  if there was an improvement in efficiency over only a part of the field 
of business enterprise in Rhodesia, the economy would benefit.” (Para. 38).
Would it? Efficiency, in this context, means, I take it, a reduction in that 
part of value added not constituting profit. Alternatively, it may mean a 
reduction in total costs—it being borne in mind that purchases, not entering 
into value added, have borne tax and that all costs will, therefore, have 
been subjected to tax in the hands of the processor concerned or at some 
earlier level of production.
Efficiency in this sense could be desirable for a number of reasons. It 
could be desirable if its result was to increase the total volume of production. 
This could, of course, come about if the increase in efficiency was reflected 
in lower prices, both at home and in export markets.
6 Essays on Economic Policy, Vol. 1, pp.266 et seq.
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VAT and the Level of Demand
But the effect of the tax is, as I have indicated, likely to be some 
additional tendency to increased prices. It is, therefore, unlikely in isolation 
to promote, but instead likely to depress the level or reduce the growth 
of domestic demand expressed in real, not money terms.
Its effects in this respect would be accentuated in two other ways. In 
the first place, the value added tax on consumption expenditure is, in my 
view, inherently regressive. It falls with greatest strength on those with a 
high propensity to consume, which usually means the low income groups.
For this reason, one might expect its introduction to be associated with 
measures rendering the rest of the tax system more, rather than less progres­
sive, thus at least maintaining the present degree of progression. It seems, 
however, that the committee’s proposals are not directed to this end. Of 
the major consequential changes suggested in the tax system, the reduction 
in the maximum rates of income tax and the elimination of supertax would 
reduce the element of progression in the tax system. As against this the abolition 
of personal tax might have some opposite effects—the remaining tax changes 
are merely incidental and, in this connection irrelevant.
On balance I suggest that the committee’s proposals in respect of other 
taxes probably do not reduce the basically regressive nature of the value 
added tax and that the overall effect of the changes suggested is, in con­
sequence, to reduce the progression or add to the regression of the tax 
system.
I must here note that the Committee itself says:—
“ . . . although a narrow view of the changes outlined in the hypothetical 
scheme might cause them to be regarded as regressive in nature, a wider 
view, taking in their longer term effects, could lead to the opposite con­
clusion”. (Para. 63).
In the absence of any clear explanation of the “wider view”, I  tend,
therefore, to what the Committee describes as a “narrow view” .
On my “narrow view” it seems to me that the tax being regressive, 
falling most heavily on those with a high propensity to consume, and the 
tax concessions, by contrast, tending to benefit those with a higher propensity 
to save, its introduction is likely, at least initially, to have some depressing 
effect on domestic consumer demand.
The second of the factors accentuating the depressing effect of the tax 
on domestic consumer demand is that the search for efficiency, which is 
seen—though not by me—as one of the main beneficial effects of the value 
added tax, will, if it takes place, tend in some fair measure to concentrate
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on a  reduction in the semi and unskilled labour force. This is, after all, 
one of the components in costs, or value added, most easily varied in the 
short term.
To the extent that this reduces—or limits the rate of growth—of em­
ployment, it will reinforce the tendency of the new tax to depress the level 
or reduce the rate of growth of the domestic market.
A subsidiary point is that the proposed value added tax, allowing for 
the deduction from taxable income of all capital purchases and requiring 
the inclusion in it only of the residual value of capital goods sold provides 
no disincentive and, possibly, some incentive towards investment in more 
capital-intensive means of production. Sullivan, for example, notes that:—
“ . . . a study by the German Ministry of Finance of the application of 
the French value-added tax in Saarland reached the conclusion that the 
exemption of investment goods severely discriminates in favour of capital- 
intensive enterprises as against those which are labour-intensive”. (Page 
122).
My point, thus far, is that:—
(a) the introduction of the value added tax is likely to add to the upward 
pressure on domestic prices and, hence, to depress the size or growth 
of the domestic market—as the Committee put it, “If prices rose and 
earnings remained static there would be a contraction in demand, 
especially at the lower levels where little or no saving is possible”. 
(Para. 62).
(b) this depressant effect is likely to be accentuated by the regressive nature 
of the tax taken with the other changes proposed in the fiscal system, 
which will tend to redistribute incomes from those with the highest 
to those with lower propensities to consume; and
(c) the depressant effect is likely to be further accentuated by a tendency 
for the search for “efficiency” postulated by advocates of the tax to 
reduce the level, or limit the growth of employment.
This last point was, of course, not overlooked by the Committee, which 
remarked:—
“If increased productivity of labour and greater capitalisation were not 
accompanied by a corresponding increase in the volume of production 
there would be some unemployment or at least a further decline in the 
rate of absorption of labour; however, it would be reasonable to expect 
that the volume of production would also rise, especially if VAT succeeded 
in accelerating the development of exports, and that further employment 
opportunities would thus be created”. (Para. 60.)
VALUE-ADDED TAXATION 17
Exports
I have given my reasons for discounting the prospects of a rise in 
production for domestic consumption, so what of exports to whose growth 
the Committee clearly attached some importance? Here one has an almost 
unanimous chorus in praise of the tax. It should not be levied on exports, 
thereby giving an incentive to exporters. This is an incentive which does 
not constitute dumping but which instead complies with the code of inter­
national behaviour contained in, for example, the GATT. In the words of 
“1066 and All That”, it is a Good Thing.
Yet I wonder whether the introduction of the new tax will have any 
markedly stimulant effect on our exports. These will be relieved of the 
value added tax—and profits accruing from them will, of course, in principle, 
be taxed at only 6/- instead of 7/3d. in the pound.
A simple relief from the value added tax will, of course, reduce the 
total costs of production, including tax, of the exported product below that 
of the like product made for domestic consumptoin. It will not, however, 
of itself reduce the costs of the export below its present untaxed level.
It is only if the influence of the value added tax in increasing efficiency 
—an influence stemming from its effects on domestic transactions and one 
I have suggested is over-stated—spills over to exports, as well it might in 
the case of firms producing like goods for sale at home and abroad that a 
cost reduction might strengthen the competitive position of Rhodesian 
goods abroad.
Even then, and assuming that producers passed on this cost reduction 
to foreign customers in the form of reduced prices, the resultant increase 
in the volume of export sales would depend entirely on the elasticity of 
demand in foreign markets. Whether or not this would be great enough to 
offset the depression of domestic demand resulting directly from the probable 
increase in prices and indirectly from the redistribution of incomes and 
the possible reduction in employment or its rate of growth is surely a moot 
point.
Possibly more important is the point that the relief of exports from the 
tax should increase the relative profitability of export sales compared with 
domestic sales. This might give businessmen an incentive to go out and sell 
more abroad, but I am inclined to doubt its effectiveness as a major stimulant 
of the volume of domestic output. Once again, the expansion of exports would 
be largely a reflection of the elasticity of demand in foreign markets. In 
addition, the tax concessions lately allowed to exporters represent, I suggest, 
a far more potent incentive to the development of external trade to which
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the new tax could at best make a  marginal addition. Though this potential 
marginal benefit should not be ignored, it seems plain that it cannot of itself 
justify, or even add much to the justification of the introduction of the new tax.
VAT and the Wage Level
Finally, the rise in prices the new tax is likely to cause will, it must be 
recognised, probably be accompanied by an upward pressure on wage levels. 
This is, in guarded or qualified terms, recognised by the Committee. Thus:—
“Any (price) increases that did occur would encourage demands for higher 
wages . . . ”, (Para. 54). 
and:—
“ . . .  the worst possible increase in consumer prices arising from the intro­
duction of VAT is not large in relation to the normal annual movement 
in wages and prices. It is, however, sufficiently large to justify giving 
consideration to phasing the introduction of the tax over, say, three or 
four years” . (Para. 56).
While the committee may be right in its view that the potential effects 
of the tax on price and wage levels are not great by comparison with the 
“normal” rising trend, they must represent some acceleration of the upward 
drift. On this basis, it seems to me fair to postulate that:—
(a) the accelerated wage drift will, to some extent and over a period of time, 
operate to reverse the initial redistributive effects of the committee’s tax 
proposals on disposable incomes, net of taxes; and
(b) this will in turn operate to minimise the depressing effects of the initial 
tax changes on the volume of domestic demand; but
(c) it will increase the pressure to reduce costs by reducing the size, or at 
least the growth of the labour force, strengthening that potential depres­
sant of domestic demand; and
(d) it will tend to weaken the competitive strength of the country’s exports, 
thus offsetting any effects of the new tax in stimulating exports.
To sum up, it seems to be that the “efficiency”, to whose promotion 
the advocates of the value added tax attach considerable importance, may, 
in Rhodesian conditions and given the manner of introduction of the tax 
suggested by the Committee, prove something less than a boon. I  suggest 
that the effects of the tax in promoting efficiency are probably overstated, 
that the tax may, despite any additional efficiency achieved, have a depressing 
effect on the volume of demand and, hence, of domestic production and that
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its main effect in this field may prove to be a reduction in employment below 
the levels it would otherwise have achieved. I find it remarkable that a 
country where labour is the factor of production in abundant—indeed over­
abundant-supply should see any merit in this last potential effect of the tax.
The African Peasant Fanner
My broad fears in this respect are compounded by the particular position 
in which our peasant farmers are likely to find themselves. A large-scale, or 
European farmer will, effectively, pay 1\%  on the gross value of his production 
—this is the effect of taxing him at 1 \%  on his value added, being his gross 
revenue from sales less those of his input items already taxed at 1\% - A  
small-scale African peasant farmer will pay the 1\%  tax incorporated in the 
price of his input items, but will not himself pay that tax on his own added 
value. To this point, the African peasant is in a preferred position.
But the buyer of produce from the European farmer can deduct its 
entire value from his gross revenue to arrive at his own taxable value added. 
The result will be that his sales, like those of the farmer, will effectively have 
been taxed at 1\%  on their total value.
The buyer of produce from the peasant will not, however, be able to 
deduct its cost from his subsequent sales revenue. He will, instead, have to 
pay the 1\%  tax on it as well as on his own added value. Thus the produce 
of a non-taxable producer will be worth less to him than that of a taxable 
producer and his natural reaction will be to reduce the price paid for the 
former by the amount of his additional tax liability arising from its use.
This would not place the peasant producer at any disadvantage if he 
had no taxed inputs. It would mean only that he was burdened by the tax 
as a reduction in the price paid to him rather than as a deduction made by 
him from his receipts. But, where he has such taxed inputs—and their amount 
must rise if peasant agriculture is to be developed—he will be at a dis­
advantage. His whole produce will be taxed at the standard rate without 
allowance for the tax already incorporated in his inputs. He will, in effect, 
be subject to double taxation.
I think we all agree that it is essential to Rhodesia’s economic future 
that the productivity of our peasant farmers be increased and increased 
rapidly. Any adverse effect of the new tax on this process is, in consequence, 
deplorable.
The Committee itself recognised this problem, though specifically in 
terms of the increased cost of input materials rather than the depressed value 
of the products to its purchaser.
2 0 RHODESIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
It said that it:—
“ . . agreed that the tribesmen should be assisted to overcome this difficulty, 
but felt that it was not in a position to suggest the means by which this 
could best be done . . (Para. 70).
1 harbour most serious doubts of whether such means can be found which 
will at one and the same time relieve peasant farmers of any disadvantage, 
avoid giving them an unjustifiably preferred position and recognise their 
different levels of advancement and efficiency. Yet this must be done if a 
serious objection to the new tax is to be removed.
Effect on Investment
Before summing up my remarks, 1 should like to deal, albeit briefly, 
with two other points. The first is the effect of the new tax on investment. 
The Committee claims that, with higher prices offset by lower taxes as far 
as those with incomes sufficient to yield substantial savings are concerned, 
there is no reason to expect the level of savings to be markedly affected. I  do 
not dispute this.
The Committee also remarks that, if the tax raised efficiency and reduced 
taxes on profits “ . . . not only would existing resources be more fully 
exploited but projects hitherto regarded as uneconomic could be profitably 
developed.” (Para. 44). It links this with an allegedly favourable effect of the
tax on the inflow of capital.
This line of argument seems to me to some extent ill-founded. The
proposals are not intended to reduce the overall incidence of the taxation 
on the economy; they merely redistribute it. In so doing, they are, I  have 
suggested, likely to redistribute it in such a way as to reduce the effective 
level of consumer demand. This redistributive effect may, in time, be offset 
by an accelerated rise in the earnings of those low down the economic scale, 
reducing the present very wide range of incomes. This would, however, both 
weaken the competitive position of Rhodesian products at home and abroad, 
offsetting any higher efficiency secured through the working of the tax, and 
reduce the volume of employment below the level otherwise reached. It 
cannot, therefore, be looked to as a restorative of the level of demand.
Then savings in isolation have little to commend them, while investment 
is, surely, undertaken in the light of an assessment of likely future market 
trends. If the growth of the market given the new tax is likely to be slower 
than without it—a possibility which should, I  believe, be seriously considered 
—then the tax is likely to be a disincentive, not an incentive to investment. 
Any effect it might have in this respect would, over time and through the 
operation of the multiplier, of course, tend to be cumulative.
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Economic Planning
The second of the points to which I wish briefly to refer is the role of 
the tax in planning. Some advocates of the value-added tax undoubtedly 
view it as a means of controlling the level of private consumption expenditure 
and, hence, as at least one means of causing the nation’s expenditure to be 
distributed between the private and public sectors and between consumption 
and expenditure in accordance with some pre-determined plan.
This view certainly underlies the element of administrative flexibility 
in rates of purchase and excise taxes introduced in Britain in 1961. It must 
also account for our own Committee’s remark that:—
“ . . . indirect taxes such as VAT can be used much more effectively than 
income tax as an ecomonic regulator since changes in the level of tax can 
be brought to bear more quickly”. (Para. 64).
I am, as you have gathered, no admirer of economic planning, whether 
of the Communist mandatory or French indicative variants, but I do accept 
a need for the state from time to time to intervene to influence the levels of 
consumption, investment and so on. I doubt, however, whether its inter­
vention can be, or should seek to be frequent and precise; I  believe, instead, 
that the most which can reasonably be attempted is the acceleration or 
reversal of general trends, a course requiring only more occasional inter­
vention. For this reason I discount the value of the new tax as an ecomonic 
regulator.
What is more, I have no claim to be an expert on the French economy, 
but I  have, in preparation for this paper, sought information on the use of 
that country’s value-added tax as a regulator. I have sought in vain; I  have 
found no reference to its use as a major effective element in the control of 
private consumption or even to any frequent or major alteration in its rates 
reflecting its attempted use in this role.
I  wonder whether the explanation is not at least partly given by the 
Irish economist I  earlier quoted:—
“Some economists go so far as to think that the rate of turnover tax can 
be varied up or down according to the necessity to restrict private spending. 
This, in my view, is a totally unrealistic approach. So far as Ireland is 
concerned, it does not take account of the two major factors which arose 
in our economy; the practical difficulty which business had in dealing with 
even a fixed rate of tax, and the trade union pressure which came after the 
introduction of the turnover tax for increased wages because of changes 
hi the price level”. (M. J. MacCormac p. 9).
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Conclusions
I fear my remarks this evening have to some extent taken the form of a 
criticism of our Rhodesian Committee’s report. I do think, however, that it, 
following other advocates of the value added tax, has in some respects 
claimed too much in favour of, and conceded too little against the tax.
I  frankly admit that, for my part, I  was myself until recently a  firm 
advocate of the tax. I  have still not renounced it, but am now less satisfied 
of its merits, which I earlier took for granted. I wonder whether our Com­
mittee, and the Government which may carry out its recommendations, may 
not also have taken too favourable a view of something new, something 
gaining growing acceptance but in conditions remote from our own, something 
at least partly sanctified by its French origin.
But I  must leave you with one further thought. Benjamin Franklin once 
wrote:—
“ . . .  in this world nothing can be said to be certain, except death or taxes”.
We can assume taxes to be a certain feature of our future and all we are 
here discussing is the, to me, subsidiary point of how to levy them. This is a 
subject which some may find fascinating and which deserves serious thought. 
It should not, however, be allowed to generate heated argument and dissension.
Salisbury.
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